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The expansion of democracy following the collapse of communism in 1989-90 
led many to believe that democratic institutions would rapidly take root. However, over 
the past decade, electoral malpractice has become widespread, casting doubt on 
democratic consolidation. This paper examines the causes and consequences of weak 
electoral integrity in Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. Using a series of opinion surveys 
conducted since 2000, we show that public perceptions of electoral unfairness have 
their roots in seeing widespread corruption among public officials. By contrast, viewing 
elections as fair correlates with support for the incumbent government, and in watching 
television, the latter showing the importance to the regimes of control of the mass 
media. In turn, views about electoral integrity have a significant impact on satisfaction 
with democracy, especially in Belarus. The results suggest that only root and branch 
reform in the postcommunist societies will substantially improve public perceptions of 
electoral integrity. 
Electoral Integrity and Support for Democracy 
in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 
Countries transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy have a wide range of 
problems to confront, any one of which can derail the transition process. The opening up of 
the economy to market pressures is invariably accompanied by plunging living standards and 
intense political and social pressures. In many instances, these pressures are sufficient to tip 
the country back into authoritarian rule (Linz and Stepan, 1996). At least as important as 
economic prosperity is the establishment of widely supported democratic institutions. Without 
such institutions, and the rules and procedures that underpin them, democratic consolidation is 
unlikely to take root and a return to authoritarianism becomes ever more likely. Key among 
the institutions that require widespread public support in order to foster democratic 
consolidation is elections. 
The efficient operation of democracy assumes, as a minimum requirement, the existence 
of free, competitive elections. However, as elections have proliferated around the world in 
many diverse political and cultural settings, it has become apparent that while elections may 
often be ‘free’ by a strict definition of the term, ruling parties and incumbent elites may still 
exercise such an influence on the outcome that they can hardly be considered ‘fair’. 
Manipulating the outcome of an election can be achieved in a variety of indirect ways, such as 
stifling debate or restricting media freedom, so that an election, while nominally competitive 
and open to no serious objection in the way in which the votes are counted, may all the same 
be heavily weighted in favour of the governing authorities (Birch, 2012; Schedler, 2006). In 
fact, undermining an election can occur at any point in the electoral cycle, from the pre-
election period through to the campaign and its aftermath (Norris, 2012). 
A lack of electoral integrity can, of course, have broader implications for the political 
system as a whole. Political institutions and how they operate reveal messages about the 
principles and norms of the political culture that shape people’s beliefs and values (Galbreath 
and Rose, 2008). A lack of integrity in electoral institutions undermines the basic principles of 
fairness and impartiality that lie at the heart of a well-ordered and functioning democratic 
society. Moreover, a political culture that sustains widespread corruption harms democratic 
citizenship, by weakening democratic knowledge and citizens’ sense of efficacy and trust in 
the institutions of government (Linde, 2012; Rothstein, 2009). And not least, institutional 
corruption further encourages low-level societal corruption in a vicious circle that continually 
undermines public support for democratic values. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the public’s perception of electoral fairness in 
countries transitioning from communism to democracy influences their views of the 
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democratic process. Our cases studies are Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, all countries where, 
more than a decade ago, it appeared that the achievement of full democratization was just a 
matter of time. In the last decade, however, all three countries (and particularly the first two) 
have returned to authoritarian rule while still retaining a nominal commitment to free and 
competitive elections. The first section reviews the research on free elections and their links to 
democratic consolidation. The second section provides an overview of elections in the three 
countries, while the third section examines the means by which elections in the three countries 
have been manipulated as well as the broader context of corruption among public official. The 
fourth section tests four explanations for beliefs about electoral integrity and evaluates the 
impact of electoral integrity on satisfaction with democracy. 
Electoral Integrity and Democracy 
Since the 1990s, with the rapid expansion of democracy across the world, the fairness of 
electoral procedures has come under increasing scrutiny. Scholars have examined the forensics 
of elections, using mathematical formulas in order to detect the existence of systematic 
malpractice (see, for example, Alvarez, Hall and Hyde, 2008; Myagkov, Ordeshook and 
Shakin, 2009). This approach hypothesizes that manipulation takes place centrally, normally 
through electoral management bodies, during or after the formal vote counting procedure. A 
second theme has been to examine the manipulation of election rules, often involving who can 
stand for election or gain access to the mass media, in order to restrict free competition (see, 
for example, Lindberg, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). For this to occur, rules have to be put 
in place well before the election. And a third theme has involved the scrutiny of election 
management bodies and the role of international observers in overseeing the integrity of the 
process (see, for example, Hyde, 2011, Kelley, 2012). The role of electoral management 
bodies has been particularly sensitive, given the scope for placing partisans in positions of 
authority where they have considerable scope to falsify the election result. 
While these approaches provide important perspectives on electoral integrity, for the 
most part they ignore perhaps the most important element of an election: how citizens’ views 
of the electoral process influence their attitudes towards democracy and their support for the 
system as a whole. In most democracies, voting is the one act which involves the majority of 
the population, and for many it is their only engagement with the political process. As a 
consequence, a widespread view among the public that election manipulation takes place will 
arguably undermine public support for democracy, and leave open the possibility of a return to 
‘more orderly’ and predictable authoritarian rule. Equally, if the public sees a high level of 
integrity in the process, then they will be encouraged to turnout to vote, an act which itself 
enhances support for democracy (Blais, 2000; Anderson et al, 2005). In principle, then, the 
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public’s faith in the integrity of their electoral institutions should have a major impact on 
broad, public support for democracy itself. 
Cross-national research already exists on this important aspect of electoral integrity. 
Sarah Birch (2008, 2010, 2012) has conducted a series of studies covering electoral integrity 
across a wide range of countries, including established as well as new democracies. These 
studies have generally shown a strong link between lack of confidence in the electoral system 
and weak support for basic democratic values and procedures. In particular, the public funding 
of parties and proportional representation electoral systems have strong impacts on confidence, 
more so than confidence in the integrity of the electoral process itself. Counter-intuitively, 
Birch also shows that independent electoral management bodies are negatively associated with 
confidence, a finding which she attributes to ‘the fact that many such bodies have been 
introduced in response to perceived problems with impartiality’ (Birch, 2008: 313). 
Research which has focused on electoral integrity in the postcommunist countries is 
more limited. Two studies have examined Russia. Using survey data to examine beliefs about 
the fairness of the 2007 Duma Election, Rose and Mishler (2009: 130) find that ‘seeing an 
election as unfair is likely to make people less proud of their country, less trustful of political 
institutions, and less supportive of their regime.’ However, they also find a strong partisan 
element in these popular evaluations, so that if one’s party is seen to win, then the perceived 
fairness of the election is largely irrelevant. Using a wider range of surveys conducted over a 
longer timespan, these findings are largely confirmed by McAllister and White (2011), who 
see perceptions of fairness declining during the Putin years, which in turn is linked to public 
views about the widespread nature of corruption in Russian society. 
We extend this research in several ways. First, we cover not just Russia but Belarus and 
Ukraine, two countries with close links to Russia but where the process of democratization has 
slowed or even reversed. Second, we evaluate possible explanations for public perceptions of 
electoral fairness, since direct experience of electoral malpractice is minimal. Third, we 
examine the impact of these beliefs on democratic values and the likelihood of electoral 
participation. The data come from a series of national surveys conducted by the authors in the 
three countries since 2000, using the assistance of local agencies; these surveys provide an 
unrivalled overview of the trajectory of electoral integrity across the three countries. Full 
details of the surveys are given in the Appendix. 
Postcommunist Democratic Consolidation 
Initially, international judgments on postcommunist elections were broadly favourable. 
The political monopoly of the Marxist-Leninist years had been replaced by a competitive 
choice of elected representatives underpinned by constitutions that guaranteed the full range of 
liberal freedoms, including a separation of powers, the rule of law and minority rights. In 
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Russia there were guarantees of ‘political diversity’ and ‘multiparty politics’; no ideology 
could be obligatory, or in any way official. Indeed, there was freedom of information 
legislation that was not yet available in many of the Western democracies. And remarkably, 
domestic legislation was explicitly subordinate to the ‘generally recognised principles and 
norms of international law’ as well as the treaty commitments into which the state had entered; 
in the event of any divergence between the two, it was the international treaty that would have 
precedence.1 
The elections that took place in the early postcommunist years appeared to bear out these 
confident predictions. All the republics had moved towards a choice of candidate, if not of 
party, by the late Soviet period. Russia, from 1993 onwards, had multiparty as well as 
multicandidate elections, organized in the first instance on a basis by which half the seats in 
the legislature were filled by contests in single-member constituencies distributed across the 
country, and the other half by a national party-list contest in which seats were allocated in 
proportion to votes received provided a 5 percent threshold had been satisfied. The Ukrainian 
system was based initially on single-seat constituencies; in 1998 and 2002 on a mixed 
constituency and party-list system; in 2006 and 2007 on the exclusively party-list system that 
has been in operation in Russia since 2005; and from 2012 onwards it has been organised on a 
mixed constituency and party-list basis. The Belarusian lower house has been elected 
throughout on a single-member constituency basis, with successful candidates required to 
obtain an absolute majority of the ballot. 
Initially, international assessments of the quality of this novel process were positive. The 
OSCE’s first observation mission to a Russian parliamentary election, in 1999, reported that 
the elections represented a ‘benchmark in the Federation’s advancement toward representative 
democracy’ and a solid turnout had shown a ‘respectable level of public confidence in the 
process’ (OSCE, 2000: 1-4). Later reports were less enthusiastic, reflecting a political system 
in which authoritarian elements had become stronger with the accession of Vladimir Putin in 
the place of Boris Yeltsin. The 2003 Duma election, the OSCE reported, though ‘well-
administered’, had ‘failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments for democratic elections, 
most notably those pertaining to unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis; 
a clear separation between the state and political parties; and guarantees to enable political 
parties to compete on the basis of equal treatment (OSCE, 2004: 1). In 2007 and 2008, after a 
disagreement with the Central Electoral Commission, there was no official mission, but 
smaller groups of ad hoc observers concluded that the Duma election had ‘definitely not 
[been] fair’ in spite of a choice of voting options (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 
2007: point 40) and that the presidential election had ‘repeated most of the flaws revealed 
during the Duma elections of December 2007’ (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 
2008: point 33). 
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The OSCE mission that took place in December 2011 found that the elections had once 
again been ‘technically well-administered’, but that they had also been ‘marked by the 
convergence of the state and the governing party’ and ‘slanted in favour of the ruling party’. 
This had been apparent in the lack of independence of the election administration, the 
partiality of most of the media and undue interference by the state authorities at various levels, 
all of which had not provided the ‘necessary conditions for fair electoral competition’. The 
quality of the election process, moreover, had ‘deteriorated considerably during the count’, 
which had been characterised by ‘frequent procedural violations and instances of apparent 
manipulation, including several serious indications of ballot box stuffing’. Opposition parties 
had complained about ‘undue restrictions on the right to hold rallies’, and television coverage 
had been ‘dominated by reports of state officials’ activities’ (OSCE, 2012: 1-2). 
Developments of this kind could scarcely be reconciled with the democratization 
narrative that had predominated in the early 1990s, and there was a wide measure of 
agreement with the view that the time had come to ‘abandon the transition paradigm’ 
altogether (Carothers, 2002). Ukraine was an exception, after the 2004 Orange Revolution had 
forced the cancellation of a clearly falsified presidential election and then a new contest in 
which the pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, had been successful. Although some 
commentaries suggested a regression after the 2010 presidential contest brought his defeated 
rival, Viktor Yanukovych, to power, international observers remained satisfied with the 
electoral process itself. The parliamentary election of 2007, they reported, had been ‘mostly in 
line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for 
democratic elections’ (OSCE 2007: 1) and the 2010 presidential contest itself had been a 
‘transparent’ exercise that had offered voters an ‘open and competitive environment’ (OSCE 
2010: 1). 
It was rather different in Belarus, after a constitutional referendum in 1996 (whose 
legitimacy was not accepted by Western governments) that had given additional powers to the 
presidency, and then another referendum in 2004 that allowed the incumbent an unlimited 
number of terms of office. Lukashenko, his opponents agreed, was popular, but not so popular 
as to obtain nearly 80 percent of the vote in a presidential election in 2010 that showed (in the 
view of international observers) that Belarus still had a ‘considerable way to go in meeting its 
OSCE commitments for democratic elections’ (OSCE 2011: 1). Meanwhile in Russia a 
‘Putinist system’ was developing in which there were elections that effectively excluded a 
serious challenge to the authorities, a Kremlin-sponsored ‘party of power’ that held up to two-
thirds of the seats in the legislature, a ‘superpresidency’ that monopolised the political agenda, 
and a regime that dominated the wider society in a manner that had something in common 
with the ‘leading role’ that had formerly been enjoyed by the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Mendras, 2012). 
 6 
One summary measure of these changes was the assessment that was regularly provided 
by the US-based organisation Freedom House. In 1990, a substantially reformed Soviet Union 
had already been classified as ‘partly free’. For some time its postcommunist successor was 
given a similar rating, but in 2004 it dropped from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’, where it has 
remained (as of 2013 it was considered to be a ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’). Ukraine 
moved in the opposite direction (as of 2013 it was a ‘transitional government or hybrid 
regime’), but Belarus became ‘not free’ in 1996 and has remained there since then. Most of the 
other post-Soviet republics—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan—were also classified as ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’; Armenia was 
‘semi-consolidated’. Of the original 15, only the Baltic states were regarded as ‘free’ in 2012; 
and of the others, only Georgia and Moldova as well as Ukraine were as much as ‘transitional 
or hybrid.’2 
This was admittedly only one among a number of attempts that had been made to 
identify the type of polity that lay in the ‘grey zone’ between established liberal democracies 
and unqualified dictatorships; other suggestions ranged as far as ‘feudalism’ (Shlapentokh, 
2007) to ‘third world patrimonialism with Bonapartist tendencies’ (Marwick, 1999: 127). A 
proposal that gathered more support in the early 2000s was ‘competitive authoritarianism’, 
which was another way of distinguishing a type of regime that combined electoral competition 
with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Unlike single-party systems and military 
dictatorships, there was an opposition in regimes of this kind that could vigorously and 
sometimes successfully compete for power. But the competition in which they engaged was 
unfair, because of ‘electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and 
varying degrees of harassment and violence [that] skewed the playing field in favor of 
incumbents’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 3-4). There were 35 states that could be classified in 
this way in the first half of the 1990s, including Russia and Ukraine as well as four of the other 
post-Soviet republics. In the next section we examine the ways in which electoral 
manipulation has taken place in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. 
The Process of Electoral Manipulation 
There were several mechanisms by which outcomes could be manipulated in the 
authoritarian elections that took place in the three regimes (Schedler, 2006; White et al, 2012). 
First, the law was frequently changed in ways that were normally to the advantage of the 
incumbents. The Russian parliamentary election law, for example, was amended 26 times 
between its adoption in 2005 and the spring of 2012; a particularly important change was the 
elimination of single-member constituencies and with them the possibility of independent 
candidates who could articulate the interests of local elites—and sometimes of ordinary 
citizens—as against the federal authorities. Rules on the nomination of candidates could also 
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be changed in ways that made it easier to exclude a potential challenger, such as by faulting 
the signatures on nomination papers. In Ukraine, more than 400 attempted nominations were 
rejected on this basis in the parliamentary election of October 2012, mostly for ‘minor 
omissions’; former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko was excluded from her own party list as 
she was in prison following what Western governments regarded as a transparently political 
trial (OSCE, 2013: 15-16).  
Second, the electoral commissions in the three countries were disproportionately staffed 
by regime loyalists. For example, the head of the Central Electoral Commission in Russia, 
Vladimir Churov, was a long-standing friend of the President who was widely celebrated for 
his ‘first law’—that ‘Putin is always right’(Kommersant, 9 April 2007: 1). Regime-favoured 
parties and candidates could in any case make use of ‘administrative resource’, or the support 
of the state itself, in advancing their campaign. Governors, for instance, could take a place on 
the party list and use the support that was available from their office to campaign without 
necessarily taking their seats in the legislature. They could issue instructions to their 
subordinates within the various structures that were financed by the state itself, such as schools 
and hospitals. And Kremlin-sponsored parties and candidates at all levels could be sure of 
more extended and favourable treatment in the mass media, especially television. In Ukraine, 
similarly, there was a ‘clear bias’ in favour of the President’s own Party of the Regions, with 
48 percent of all campaign coverage on the state-owned First National channel, and in 
overwhelmingly positive tones, as compared with 17 percent for its principal competitor 
(OSCE, 2013: 23). 
Third, manipulation could take place on election day itself. There could be pressure to 
vote, to abstain, or to vote in advance. In Russia there was a mobile voting facility that 
allowed electors to vote in their own homes in the presence of election officials, but normally 
beyond the reach of independent observers (more than six million votes were cast in this way 
in March 2012; in the Ukrainian parliamentary election the following October, the same figure 
was more than a million). There could be old-fashioned ballot stuffing. And there could be 
inducements, including cash payments. In the 2007 Russian Duma election, voters were 
offered a free consultation with a gynecologist or urologist in the polling station itself; in 
Kemerovo they were invited to sample cheese and spirits (although no more than 100 grams a 
person); in Tomsk, students were offered free railway tickets; in oil-rich Tyumen, a vote for 
United Russia could be worth a thousand rubles (at the time, about $41) (White et al, 2012: 
545-6). Payments of this kind were often associated with ‘carousel voting’, with the same 
electors voting at a series of polling stations and often doing so in organised groups, in a fleet 
of buses. 
Inevitably, the scale of any election will bring some instances of manipulation or fraud. 
In Russia, for example, elections encompass nearly 100,000 polling stations spread across a 
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seventh of the world’s entire land surface; some departure from official practice is unlikely to 
be avoided. But how much difference has electoral manipulation made? Putin himself thought 
it ‘possible’ there had been irregularities—‘probably there were some … but they can only 
influence hundredths of a percent. Well, maybe one percent, that I can imagine. But no more’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 8 March 2012: 12). The head of the Central Electoral Commission, 
Vladimir Churov, routinely pointed out that the officially declared results had been close to the 
forecasts of the major survey organisations, which was a form of independent confirmation 
(the CEC compared their results with the agencies’ final predictions, which took account of 
their latest returns but could not legally be published over the five days that preceded polling). 
The final results were also close to the exit polls that had been reported immediately after the 
polling stations had completed their business (White et al, 2012: 671). 
All the same, in Russia there was some divergence between the survey results and the 
official figures that one of the largest survey organisations, the All-Russian Centre for the 
Study of Public Opinion (normally pro-Kremlin), attributed directly to falsification. And there 
were smaller survey organisations that had successfully predicted the outcome on the basis of 
a figure that had been ‘corrected for administrative resource’, which meant that they had been 
‘attempting to predict the scale of falsification, and not to reflect public opinion as accurately 
as possible’ (Moskovskie novosti, 20 March 2012: 2). On our own evidence, using a Levada 
survey of 1,600 respondents conducted between 16 and 20 December (in other words two 
weeks after polling day), 46 percent had voted for United Russia (the official result was 49.3 
percent), the Communist Party took 17 percent (the official result was 19.2 percent), and Fair 
Russia and the Liberal Democrats both took 12 percent (the official results were 13.2 and 11.7 
percent respectively) (Rose, 2012: 26). In March 2012, our survey predictions were 61 percent 
for Putin, as compared with the declared result of 63.6 percent (Rose, 2012: 27). 
Finally, any analysis of fairness in postcommunist elections has to take into account the 
public’s perceptions of the level of corruption among public officials. A large proportion of 
the citizens within the postcommunist states believe that corruption is widespread and that 
little is being done to combat the problem. Moreover, most believe that in order to get by in 
their day-to-day lives—whether it is seeing a doctor, gaining a university place for a child, or 
avoiding a traffic fine—they must ‘play the game’. This inevitably involves colluding in a 
corrupt act. In other words, most citizens in the postcommunist societies believe that the 
system compels them to engage in corrupt behaviour (Karklins, 2006: 3). Objective indicators 
of corruption within the public sector endorse the pessimistic views of the general public about 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. In 2012, Transparency International ranked Belarus 123, Russia 
133 and Ukraine 144 out of a total of 174 countries on corruption (Transparency International, 
2012). Moreover, there has been relatively little change in these rankings during the course of 
the decade. 
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The surveys underpin the view of endemic corruption in Belarus, Russia and the 
Ukraine. In Russia and Ukraine, Figure 1 shows that a large majority believe that ‘most’ or 
‘almost all’ public officials are corrupt. Indeed, in 2006 and 2007 more than nine out of every 
10 respondents in Ukraine took this view. In Russia there has been a marginal decline in 
perceptions of corruption over the 2000 to 2012 period, but even so in 2012 almost three in 
every four respondents believed that corruption among public officials was widespread. The 
trend in Belarus differs from that observed in Russia and Ukraine, with high levels existing 
until 2006, and then a marked decline thereafter, dropping to 42 percent in 2011. This reflects 
efforts by the regime to combat the problem, which have been more effective than elsewhere 
because of its centralized, authoritarian nature.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
By any standards, corruption is an endemic problem in the three societies, and more 
generally within the postcommunist world, regardless of whether or not they are members of 
the EU (Holmes, 2006; Linde, 2012). These pessimistic conclusions are supported by the 
objective indicators of corruption provided by independent monitors such as Transparency 
International. Since corruption starts—and often ends—with government, it would not be 
surprising if these general views about society-wide corruption were also not reflected in 
views about electoral fairness. The next section tests a range of explanations to account for the 
public’s perceptions about electoral integrity in each of the three countries. 
Results 
Public Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. We begin by examining the measurement of 
electoral integrity. The concept of electoral integrity has several dimensions. Most obviously, 
the procedures for counting the ballots must be fair. However, the concept also incorporates 
aspects of the election campaign that precede the act of voting, such as media coverage and the 
rules governing political finance. Schedler (2002: 40-41) has identified seven requirements 
that must be satisfied before an election can be considered fully ‘free and fair’. These 
requirements include: the means by which those who hold power are selected; an unrestricted 
choice of alternatives; freedom for voters to form their preferences; universal suffrage; 
freedom for voters to express their preferences; the fair aggregation of votes; and the provision 
of a mandate to government as a result of an election. Other configurations identify as many as 
nine aspects (see, for example, Norris, 2012: 12). 
The current surveys did not have the extensive range of measures that would have 
permitted us to evaluate the public’s perceptions of electoral fairness over all of these possible 
dimensions.3 The surveys did, however, have three measures of fairness that have been asked 
consistently from 2000 onwards. These are fairness in terms of: ‘the composition of the ballot 
paper and counting votes’; ‘television coverage of the election campaign’; and ‘the conduct of 
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the electoral campaign in your district’.4 These three items cover the major aspects of the 
election campaign in addition to the act of voting itself. They are strongly correlated5 so 
combining them into a single, composite scale produces a reliable measure of the integrity of 
the election in each country. We use ‘fair’ to measure an election against one or more of these 
criteria; following Rose and Mishler (2009: 118), by placing the emphasis on ‘fair’ we avoid 
the catchphrase ‘free and fair’, in which ‘multiple desiderata are indiscriminately lumped 
together’. 
By any standards, the most recent elections in the three countries are viewed by their 
respective publics as flawed, to varying degrees. In general, the results in Table 1 show that 
around two-thirds of the respondents view the election as either ‘definitely’ or ‘somewhat’ 
fair; the highest figure is 67 percent in Ukraine for seeing the TV coverage of the campaign as 
fair. At the other end of the scale, just 52 percent of the Russian respondents regarded the 
counting of the votes and the local campaign as fair. By combining the three measures into a 
single scale we can produce a parsimonious measure of the electorate’s perception of the 
overall fairness of the election. Using this metric, the elections in Belarus and Ukraine are 
regarded as being the fairest (both with a mean of 6.4 on a zero to 10 scale), and Russia as 
being the least fair (a mean of 5.4). 
[Table 1 about here] 
By estimating a single measure of electoral integrity for each country we are also able to 
evaluate the trajectory of change in electoral integrity over an extended period. Figure 2 shows 
that the decade-long trend across the three countries is towards an increase, albeit a modest 
one, in the perceived fairness of their respective elections. In Belarus and Ukraine, the change 
is in the order of half a point on the zero to 10 scale, comparing the first year for which we 
have data (2000 in both cases) with the last year (2011 for Belarus, and 2010 for Ukraine). In 
both countries the most substantial increase was in the first half of the decade, with Ukraine 
showing a decline in 2008 before an increase in 2010. The trend for Russia shows a more 
gradual increase across the decade, but a substantial decline of 0.6 of a point in 2012, 
following widespread allegations of malpractice in the presidential election of that year.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Explaining Public Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. How are these perceptions of 
electoral integrity formed? We test four hypotheses to account for these perceptions across 
three countries. The first hypothesis relates to support for the current regime—an incumbency 
effect. Since their party is a beneficiary of the electoral system, we would expect supporters of 
the current government to see greater integrity in the electoral system than opponents, other 
things being equal. The second hypothesis is that perceptions are a consequence of views 
about the level of corruption among public officials. Citizens who see more corruption among 
public officials will be more likely than others to believe that corruption exists in elections. A 
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third hypothesis is that these perceptions have their roots in experiences with other 
democracies, so that respondents compare their own elections with those in the established 
democracies and find them wanting. This is measured here by whether or not the respondents 
reported visiting the Baltic states, Poland or the United States,6 and the degree to which they 
identified themselves as European. The fourth and final hypothesis that might explain public 
opinion about electoral integrity is that perceptions about the election stem from the mass 
media, measured here by the frequency of watching national television and reading national 
newspapers.  
In order to test these four hypotheses, a series of regression equations was estimated, 
predicting whether or not the respondents considered their most recent election as fair from a 
range of independent variables reflecting the four hypotheses. The figures are partial (b) 
coefficients and standardized (beta) coefficients. The results in Table 2 show a high degree of 
consistency across the three countries in the major factors which influence the public’s 
perception of electoral integrity. Most important is incumbency, with government supporters 
being most likely to see the election as fair. Views about the general level of corruption are 
also important in all three countries, with those seeing public officials as corrupt being more 
likely to also view the election as unfair. The influence of the media, in the form of watching 
national television, is important in Belarus and Ukraine in conveying a positive view of the 
election, net of other factors.7 There are only minor effects for having a Western orientation, 
with the exception of Belarus, where reporting having travelled to democracies is likely to 
increase the propensity to see the election as unfair. 
[Table 2 about here] 
There is, then, empirical support for three of the four hypotheses, and the consistency of 
the results across the three countries suggests that these are enduring effects and not a 
consequence of particular national circumstances. As a large literature has demonstrated, 
general views about society-wide corruption has an insidious effect on public opinion towards 
all aspects of government, regardless of how corrupt it actually is (see, for example, Clausen, 
Kraay and Nyiri. 2011; Cook and Gronke, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that views about 
corruption among public officials has a major effect on how citizens view the integrity of the 
electoral process. 
Perhaps the most significant finding is the impact television coverage can exert on 
perceptions of electoral integrity, and the strong messages that it can convey about an election 
through the presentation of visual images. It is also notable that there is no parallel effect for 
newspapers. In all three countries their respective governments have gone to considerable 
lengths to restrict the freedom of television to report news. In Belarus there is a state 
monopoly on the domestic broadcast media, while international media organizations have 
considerable difficulty in gaining accreditation from the Information Ministry (Manaev, 
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Manaeva and Yuran, 2013). The Russian broadcast media have long been subjected to 
government restrictions on their freedom, more recently often broadcasting frequent 
hagiographies of Putin while almost completely ignoring opposition candidates (de Smaele, 
2013). Similar restrictions on television have also operated in Ukraine (Dyczok, 2009). The 
net effect of these restrictions on news reporting is that that many of those who consume more 
television during the election have a more positive view of the integrity of the election. 
Electoral Integrity and Support for Democracy. Popular confidence in the integrity of 
the election process is vital for regime legitimacy. When confidence is lacking there is a large 
body of evidence to suggest that democratic values become weak; since the result of the 
election is believed to be manipulated, there is little incentive for a voter to cast a ballot or to 
see democracy as fair (Schedler, 2006; Birch, 2008). Electoral integrity is therefore a vital 
component of the democratic values that exist within a society. As Birch (2010: 1615) 
concludes from her study of 31 democracies, ‘citizens who perceive elections to be fair are 
more likely to vote than those who have reservations about the conduct of electoral contests.’ 
In order to examine the impact of views about electoral integrity on satisfaction with 
democracy, Table 3 regresses the same range of independent variables that were included in 
Table 2, with the addition of electoral integrity, in order to predict satisfaction with 
democracy.8 Electoral integrity is a significant predictor of satisfaction with democracy in all 
three countries, as previous research has suggested. Indeed, in Belarus, the public’s 
perception of electoral integrity is second in importance only to being a supporter of the 
current regime. The effect is smaller in Russia and Ukraine, but even in Russia it ranks third 
in importance, behind the impact of the media. Among the other factors in the model that 
influence satisfaction with democracy, watching national television again exerts a positive 
influence on the public’s views in Belarus and Russia but not in Ukraine, while views of 
corruption among public officials undermines satisfaction in Belarus and Ukraine, but not in 
Russia. 
[Table 3 about here] 
These results confirm that electoral integrity has a strong and consistent impact on 
satisfaction with democracy. The findings underpin the conclusion that democratic 
consolidation requires an ongoing commitment among the mass public to the values and 
beliefs that underpin democracy, as much as to the institutions that govern it. The history of 
failed democracies over the last century illustrates that without such deep roots within the 
mass public, democratic institutions are likely to be fragile and easily usurped by charismatic 
leaders or radical parties intent on their destruction. Understanding the relationship between 




The collapse of communism in 1989-90 and the transition to democracy across almost all 
of the postcommunist world led to the view that democracy would rapidly become entrenched. 
Nearly a quarter of a century on, many of these expectations remain unfulfilled. Despite rapid 
progress in establishing democratic institutions during the 1990s, a decade later the transition 
to democracy across many of these countries has either stalled or reversed. Central among the 
countries to experience a reversal has been Russia, together with the countries closest to it. A 
core principle of democracy is electoral integrity, and the widespread evidence of malpractice 
in these countries has provided a graphic indicator of democracy’s retreat. Nor has this 
reversal gone unnoticed by the mass publics in these countries, as the survey data reported 
here illustrates.  
This paper has examined the consequences of beliefs about electoral integrity for 
democratic values. Through an examination of survey data collected in Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine, we have demonstrated that public perceptions of electoral integrity are substantially 
based on beliefs about corruption among public officials, on support for the current regime, 
and on television consumption. In turn, these beliefs about electoral integrity have a 
substantial impact on satisfaction with democracy. The robustness of the findings are 
underpinned by our measure of electoral integrity, which covers not just the counting of votes, 
but also access to the mass media and the conduct of the local campaign—the three major 
aspects of an election. 
The public’s beliefs about electoral integrity match closely those provided by expert 
judgments (see Birch, 2010; Norris, 2012). This suggests that the reform of election 
procedures to make them fair and transparent can change public opinion, and will have 
positive effects on attitudes to democracy and on electoral participation, However, the fact that 
these perceptions also have their roots in beliefs about more broadly based corruption among 
public officials suggests that the problem is broader than simply implementing electoral 
reform. Moreover, the apparent influence of television consumption on these attitudes 
indicates that open media access is an important component of reform. Overall, our results 
suggest dealing with the problem of electoral integrity in postcommunist societies has to be 
part of a broader approach to political reform across the societies as a whole; reforming the 
counting of votes is only one part of the process of change. Only root and branch reforms will 




Data. The 2011 Belarus survey was conducted by the Center for Sociological and 
Political Research at the Belarusian State University in Minsk. The survey was based on 
personal interviews among 1,000 respondents aged 18 years or more using a multistage 
stratified sample. The fieldwork took place between 5 and 11 March 2011 with a response rate 
of 92 percent. The 2012 Russian survey was conducted by Russian Research, based on 
personal interviews among 1,600 respondents aged 18 years or more using a multistage 
stratified sample. The fieldwork took place between 4 and 23 January 2012 with a response 
rate of 50 percent. The 2010 Ukraine survey was conducted by Russian Research, based on 
personal interviews among 1,200 respondents aged 18 years or more using a multistage 
stratified sample. The fieldwork took place between 15 and 24 February 2010 with a response 
rate of 62 percent. 
Variables. Electoral integrity is a multi-item scale combining the three items in Table 1 
into a single scale scored from zero (most unfair) to 10 (most fair). The mean correlations 
between the three items in each country and survey year are as follows. Belarus: 2000—0.58; 
2004—0.65; 2006—0.74; 2011—0.78. Russia: 2000—0.65; 2004—0.57; 2005—0.73; 2008—
0.60; 2010—0.57; 2012—0.61. Ukraine: 2000—0.52; 2006—0.61; 2008—0.60; 2010—0.68. 
In Tables 2 and 3 the variables are defined as follows. ‘Satisfaction with democracy’ is 
based on the question ‘How satisfied are you with the level of democracy in [country].’ 
‘Supports current regime’ is based on the question ‘Do you consider yourself a supporter or an 
opponent of the current government?’ ‘Public officials corrupt’ is based on the question ‘How 
widespread, in your opinion, are bribery and corruption in central and local government in 
[country]?’ ‘Travelled to democracies’ is based on the question ‘Have you ever visited any of 
the following countries … ?’  and is a cumulative scale for having visited the Baltic states, 
Poland and the United States. ‘European identity’ is based on the question ‘Do you think of 
yourself as a European?’ ‘Reads national newspapers’ and ‘watches national television’ are 
based on the question ‘How often do you … read national newspapers … watch national TV?’ 
There are slight wording variations in the questions across the three countries. Full details of 
variables, scoring and means are given in the Appendix Table. 
Appendix Table: Variables, Scoring, Means 
  Means 
  ------------------------------------------ 
Variable Codes Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Election fair From 0 (unfair) to 10 (fair) 6.42 5.52 6.40 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
4=very satisfied, 3=satisfied, 
2=unsatisfied, 1=very unsatisfied. 
2.17 2.93 2.10 
Supports current regime 3=supporter, 2=depends, 2.86 2.15 1.82 
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1=opponent. 
Public officials corrupt 4=almost all officials are corrupt, 
3=majority, 2=some, 1=hardly 
any. 
2.50 3.12 3.30 
Travelled to democracies 0 to 3 .78 .32 .41 
European identity 4=to a significant extent, 3=some 
extent, 2=sometimes, 1=not at all 
2.30 1.88 1.69 
Reads national newspapers 4=regularly, 3=sometimes, 
2=seldom, 1=never 
2.76 2.55 2.71 
Watches national TV 4=regularly, 3=sometimes, 
2=seldom, 1=never 
3.29 3.64 3.63 
Gender 1=male, 0=female .48 .46 .46 
Age Decades 4.46 4.39 4.56 
University education 1=yes, 0=no .24 .22 .28 
  (N)  (1,000) (1,600) (1,200) 
Sources Belarus 2011 survey; Russian 2012 survey; Ukraine 2010 survey.
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Notes 
                                                
1 The quotations come from article 15 of the Russian Constitution. 
2 The rankings from 1999 until 2013 are available at www.freedomhouse.org, last 
accessed 4 March 2013. 
3  This assumes, of course, that respondents could differentiate between such a detailed 
list. 
4 A fourth item, ‘representing people with different views’, was included in most of the 
surveys, but because it was not consistently asked it has been excluded. In any event, 
preliminary analysis showed that the addition of this fourth item did not add 
significantly to the overall reliability of the multiple-item scale. 
5  The mean inter-item correlation in Belarus is .69, in Russia .62, and in Ukraine .60. 
The correlations for each year are given in the Appendix. 
6 The choice of countries that the respondents reported travelling to was governed by 
what was available consistently in all three countries. 
7  Measuring television consumption is, of course, difficult since within each country a 
variety of television channels from other countries can be accessed by cable, a pattern 
of behaviour which may be associated with ethno-linguistic identification. We are 
grateful to a reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
8  We assume that the causality operates from electoral integrity to satisfaction with 
democracy. An alternative possibility is that satisfaction with democracy shapes views 
of electoral integrity. The causality cannot be definitively identified from the type of 
cross-sectional data used here, but our interpretation is supported by other research in 
this area (see, for example, Linde, 2012). 
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Figure 1: Perceived Corruption Among Public Officials, 2000-12 
 
The question was: ‘How widespread, in your opinion, are bribery and 
corruption in central and local government in [country]?’ Estimates combine 
‘most officials are corrupt’ and ‘almost all officials are corrupt’.  
Sources Belarus 2000, 2004, 2006, 2011 surveys; Russia 2000, 2004, 




Table 1: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Belarus (2011), Russia (2012) 
and the Ukraine (2010) 
 Counting votes TV campaign coverage Local campaign 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Belarus Russia Ukraine  Belarus Russia Ukraine  Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Definitely fair 35 17 27 32 19 26 34 17 30 
Somewhat fair 30 35 37 33 40 41 33 35 34 
Not very fair 17 24 19 19 21 19 15 24 17 
Not fair at all 10 15 5 10 12 5 8 13 5 
Don't know 8 9 12 6 8 9 10 11 14 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,000) (1,605) (1,200) (1,000) (1,605) (1,200) (1,000) (1,605) (1,200) 
The question was: ‘In your opinion, to what extent are elections in Ukraine fair in relation 
to … the composition of the ballot paper and counting votes … television coverage of the 
election campaign … the conduct of the electoral campaign in your district?’ 
Sources Belarus 2011 survey; Russian 2012 survey; Ukraine 2010 survey. 
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Figure 2: Perceived Fairness in the Conduct of Elections, 2000-12 
 
Scores combine items relating to the fairness of counting votes, TV 
coverage, and the local campaign. 
Sources Belarus 2000, 2004, 2006, 2011 surveys; Russia 2000, 2004, 





Table 2: Explaining the Public’s Views of Electoral Integrity 
 Belarus Russia Ukraine 
 --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Public officials corrupt -.57** -.16** -.38** -.13** -.20* -.07* 
Supports current regime 2.46** .53** 1.36** .35** 1.09** .32** 
Western orientation       
  Travelled to democracies -.27* -.07* -.12 -.03 -.07 -.02 
  European identity -.05 -.02 .09 .04 -.29* -.07* 
Mass media       
  Reads national newspapers .08 .03 -.11 -.05 -.06 -.02 
  Watches national TV .48** .14** .18 .05 .68** .19** 
Controls       
  Gender (male) -.48** -.15** -.06 -.01 .02 .00 
  Age (decades) .01 .03 .05 .03 .03 .02 
  Tertiary education -.24 -.03 .01 .00 .33* .06* 
 --------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- 
  Constant 1.06  3.06  7.01  
  Adj R-squared .50  .16  .15  
  (N) (837)  (1,181)  (1,018)  
**, statistically significant at p<.01, * p<.05. 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardized (beta) 
coefficients predicting the probability of seeing an election as fair. The dependent 
variable is scored zero to 10, see Appendix for details of the independent variables. 
Sources Belarus 2011 survey; Russian 2012 survey; Ukraine 2010 survey. 
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Table 3: Electoral Integrity and Satisfaction with Democracy 
 Belarus Russia Ukraine 
 --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Electoral integrity .09** .31** .02* .07* .03* .06* 
Public officials corrupt -.13** -.13** -.04 -.04 -.12** -.12** 
Supports current regime .45** .33** .05 .05 .17** .15** 
Western orientation       
  Travelled to democracies .01 .01 .04 .03 .01 .01 
  European identity .06** .07** .02 .03 .00 .00 
Mass media       
  Reads national newspapers -.02 -.02 -.07** -.09** -.42 -.05 
  Watches national TV .08** .08** .12** .11** .03 .03 
Controls       
  Gender (male) .02 .01 -.06 -.04 .01 .01 
  Age (decades) .01* .06* -.01 -.02 -.01 -.02 
  Tertiary education -.19** -.10** .03 .02 .12* .07* 
 --------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- 
  Constant .70  2.99  2.22  
  Adj R-squared .50  .04  .05  
  (N) (837)  (1,181)  (1,018)  
**, statistically significant at p<.01, * p<.05. 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardized (beta) 
coefficients predicting the probability of seeing an election as fair. The dependent 
variable is scored zero to 10, see Appendix for details of the independent variables. 
Sources Belarus 2011 survey; Russian 2012 survey; Ukraine 2010 survey. 
